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· Does harboring terrorism have 
economic costs? 
· How persistent are the costs of 
harboring terrorism? 
· How can civilians be discouraged to 
harbor terrorists? 
POLICY BRIEFING 




Summary: The literature on conflict and terrorism 
has  paid little attention to the  economic costs of 
terrorism  for  the  perpetrators  of  terror  attacks. 
Our  research  fills  that  gap  by  examining  the 
economic costs of harboring suicide terror attacks. 
We combine data on Palestinian suicide terrorists 
with data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, 
to identify and quantify the impact of a successful 
attack  on  unemployment  and  wages.  We  find 
robust evidence that terror attacks have important 
economic costs. They cause a significant increase 
in  unemployment  and  a  significant  decrease  in 
wages and on the number of Palestinians working 
in Israel. Importantly, these effects are persistent 













One  of  the  main  goals  of  terrorism  is  to  impose 
economic,  psychological,  sociological  and  political 
costs  on  the  targeted  society  in  order  to  coerce  its 
government  into  granting  political  and  territorial 
concessions.  Although  the  success  of  terrorists  in 
achieving this goal is still being debated (Gould and 
Klor, 2010), there is a growing body of empirical work 
showing  that  terror  campaigns  impose  important 
economic costs on the targeted societies.  
Most of the literature on the economic consequences 
of terrorism focuses on the economy of the targeted 
country.  However,  terrorism  may  also  have 
unintended economic consequences on the economy 
of  the  society  harboring  the  perpetrators  of  terror 
attacks. This is the focus of our study (Benmelech et 
al., 2010), which identifies and quantifies the effect of 
harboring  terrorists  on  the  local  economy.  In 
particular, we focus on the Palestinian economy and 
assess  the  impact  of  successful  Palestinian  suicide 
attacks  against  Israeli  targets  on  Palestinian 
unemployment,  wages  and  access  of  Palestinian 
workers to the more lucrative Israeli labor market.  
By measuring the economic costs of terrorism to the 
harboring  society,  our  study  contributes  to  the 
literature on the economic costs of conflict. There are 
two main challenges in identifying the causal effect of 
terrorism  on  the  harboring  society.  First,  in  a  large 
number  of  conflicts  plagued  by  terrorism, 
perpetrators and targeted population live side by side, 
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Terror organizations inflict significant economic 
harm to the populations they claim to represent  
would allow researchers to disentangle the effect of 
terrorism  on  the  perpetrators.  This  is  certainly  the 
case in conflicts that attracted a lot of the researchers’ 
attention,  like  the  ones  in  the 
Basque  Country,  Iraq  and 
Afghanistan. 
Second, even for those conflicts where the appropriate 
data are available, solid empirical evidence has yet to 
be  produced.  The  lack  of  evidence  based  on  these 
conflicts  is  perhaps  due to  the  difficulty involved  in 
identifying  the  causal  effect  of  terror  on  economic 
outcomes.  Alternatively,  other  factors,  like  political 
institutions and religious beliefs, may simultaneously 
affect economic conditions and the severity of terror. 
Available Data 
Our  analysis  overcomes  the  difficulties  mentioned 
above  by  relying  on  a  detailed  data  set  of  suicide 
terror attacks and local economic conditions together 
with a unique empirical strategy. The available data 
set contains detailed information on all suicide attacks 
by  Palestinians  against  Israeli  targets  in  Israel,  the 
West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip  between  September 
2000  and December 2006,  the  period of  the second 
Palestinian  uprising.  During  this  time  period  there 
were 143 suicide attacks carried out by 157 suicide 
terrorists for which we have the required information 
to be included in our analysis. These attacks combined 
resulted  in  597  Israeli  fatalities  with  over  4,040 
citizens injured. 
Not  all  suicide  terrorists  during  the  period  at  issue 
successfully reached their target and completed their 
mission. In fact, a large number of suicide terrorists in 
our data set failed in their missions and were caught 
or  intercepted  by  security  forces  or  civilians  during 
the attack. All these terrorists are clearly identified in 
reports  by  Israeli  Security  Agency.  Following  these 
reports, we classify suicide terrorists as “stopped” or 
“caught” if they: i) failed to detonate their explosive 
devices, ii) looked suspicious and were apprehended 
or  killed  by  civilians,  policemen  or  soldiers,  before 
they  were  able  to  activate  their  explosives,  iii) 
panicked and blew themselves up before they reached 
the target or died during capture, or iv) changed their 
minds and surrendered to the authorities. Out of the 
157  suicide  terrorists  in  our  sample,  there  are  39 
failed suicide terrorists: 12 were caught alive and 27 
were killed. 
We combined the data set on suicide terrorists with 
quarterly  data  from  the  Palestinian  Labor  Force 
Survey  on  districts’  economic  and  demographic 
characteristics.  This  survey,  conducted  by  the 
Palestinian  Central  Bureau  of  Statistics,  provides 
quarterly  information  on  a  rotating  representative 
sample  of  about  22,000  individuals  living  in  East 
Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We used 
the survey to obtain the three economic outcomes of 
interest  (unemployment  rate,  average  wage,  and 
percentage  of  the  district’s  population  working  in 
Israel), and also additional districts-level demographic 
characteristics,  which  we  used  as  controls  in  our 
analysis.  
Finally,  we  combined  these  two  data  sets  with 
available  data  on  two  Israeli  security  measures: 
curfews and Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities. We 
controlled for these measures of counterterrorism in 
our empirical analysis because we are not interested 
in economic costs that are directly caused by Israeli 
security policies, but in economic costs of harboring 
terrorism that are unrelated to Israeli policies.  
Empirical Strategy 
Our  empirical  strategy  exploits  the  inherent 
randomness in the success or failure of suicide terror 
attacks  as  a  source  of  exogenous  variation  to 
investigate the effects of terrorism on the perpetrators 
economic  conditions.  We  do  so  by  considering  only 
attacks that were actually initiated (i.e., in which the 
terrorist  was  dispatched),  and  use  the  exogenous 
variation  in  the  outcomes  of  these  attacks  as  our 
source of identification. We differentiate between two 
main  outcomes:  a  successfully  completed  attack 
(treatment)  and  attacks  in  which  the  terrorist  was 
“caught”  by  the  Israeli  Security  Agency  (control). 
These are all the relevant cases where the success or 
failure of the attempted suicide attack was most likely 
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A successful terror attack leads to an 
increase in unemployment by 5.3% 
Thus, our identification relies on the assumption that, 
even  if  the  initiation  of  an  attack  is  endogenously 
determined  by  economic  conditions,  conditional  on 
launching an attack, those conditions do not directly 
affect the success or failure of the operation.1  
In  addition,  our 
econometric strategy can 
rule  out  alternative 
explanations  to  the  observed  economic  fluctuations. 
First,  by  focusing  on  one  particular  conflict,  our 
analysis  is  not  affected  by  the  concerns  associated 
with  studies  based  on  cross-countries  comparisons. 
Second, we do not focus on levels, but rather changes 
of  all  variables  used  in  the  analysis,  thus  effectively 
controlling for districts’ fixed characteristics that may 
jointly affect economic conditions and the occurrence 
of  suicide  attacks.  We  also  control  for  changes  in 
districts’  demographic  characteristics  so  that  our 
results are not affected by temporary migration of part 
of the population in the aftermath of a terror attack. 
Moreover,  these  economic effects  are  obtained  after 
controlling for the economic impact of local counter-
terrorism  measures  imposed  by  the  Israeli  security 
forces  in  the  aftermath  of  an  attack.  Therefore,  we 
believe that  our  analysis  provides  reliable estimates 
on the economic costs of harboring terrorism. 
Results 
Our results show that successful suicide attacks have 
important  economic  consequences  for  the  suicide 
terrorist’s district of origin. In particular, a successful 
attack causes an immediate increase of 5.3 percent in 
the  unemployment  rate  of  an  average  Palestinian 
district (relative to the average unemployment rate). 
Evaluated  at  an  average  district,  a  suicide  terrorist 
that succeed in his or her attack causes an immediate 
increase on the district’s unemployment rate from 9.4 
percentage  points  to  up  to  almost  11  percentage 
points. In addition, a successful suicide terror attack 
causes  an  increase  of  more  than  20  percent  in  the 
                                                           
1 Economic conditions can indirectly affect the mission’s 
success. For example, Benmelech et al. (2011) show that 
dire economic conditions lead to more educated and 
experienced suicide terrorists. Benmelech and Berrebi 
(2007) in turn show that more educated and older suicide 
terrorists are less likely to fail or to be caught. 
likelihood that the district’s average wage falls in the 
quarter following an attack. Finally, a successful attack 
reduces the number of Palestinians working in Israel 
by 6.7 percent relative to its mean. Importantly, these 
economic effects persist for at least six months after 
the attack. 
The results imply that a 
successful suicide attack 
has  significant  economic  consequences  to  the 
perpetrating society.  These  economic costs could  be 
due to a number of mechanisms. Terror attacks may 
have  economic  consequences  due  to  security 
measures that prevent local residents from continuing 
to work regularly. It is also possible that even if local 
workers are not prevented from reaching their place 
of work, employers in Israel may be reluctant to hire 
workers  from  a  district  that  launched  an  attack. 
Moreover,  other  researchers  have  argued  that 
successful attacks may cause the radicalization of the 
local  population  (Jaeger  et  al.  2011;  Bueno  de 
Mesquita and Dickson, 2007). The radicalization of the 
population, in turn, brings about self-deprivation and 
the de-prioritization of economic achievement, which 
translate  into  lacking  economic  performances 
(Hillman, 2007). 
Policy recommendations 
Our  article  is  the  first  study  to  uncover  systematic 
evidence on the economic cost of harboring terrorism. 
As  such,  we  document  an  important  part  of  the 
terrorism  equation:  while  trying  to  inflict  real 
economic  costs  on  targeted  societies,  terror 
organizations also cause significant economic harm to 
the  population  that  they  claim  to  represent.  These 
findings are important for a variety of reasons. Beyond 
their direct interpretation, they highlight, for instance, 
the  importance  of  informing  the  leaders  and  the 
general population of areas harboring terrorism about 
the  extent  of  the  associated  costs.  This  information 
may dissuade supporters of terror organizations, and 
strengthen the arguments used by the more moderate 
voices against terror attacks. While in this study we 
uncover  the  costs  of  harboring  terrorism  for  the 
average population, an important next step for direct 
policy recommendations is to disentangle that effect 4 | EUSECON POLICY BRIEFING 12 DECEMBER 2011  
 
across different subpopulations. It is crucial to better 
identify  the  characteristics  of  the  individuals  most 
harmed  by  harboring  terrorism.  These  individuals 
should be the first ones mobilized by policy makers 
creating a moderate coalition against terrorism.  
Our analysis has also indirect implications regarding 
foreign monetary aid to areas that harbor terrorism. 
International  groups  and  organizations  often  claim 
that  the  general  civilian  population  of  countries 
harboring terrorism is nothing but another victim of 
terrorism. This population, living in poor conditions, 
often relies on terror organizations for the provision 
of important public goods. In return, they provide safe 
havens, support, or at least turn a “blind eye” to terror 
activities. As the claim goes, promoting education and 
development  in  these  areas  will  free  the  civilian 
population from their reliance on terror organizations 
and,  over  time,  cause  a  decrease  in  the  level  of 
violence.  Our  results  call  into  question  the  overall 
effect of foreign aid. While it is desirable to promote 
education and development of any population, foreign 
monetary  aid  to  countries  harboring  terror 
organizations  mitigates  the  economic  costs  of 
terrorism. As such, it dampens the incentives of the 
general civilian population to mobilize against terror 
groups that claim to further their political grievances 
by means of violent methods. 
Finally, our findings raise the question of whether or 
not the deliberate imposition of economic costs is an 
effective  counter-terrorism  policy.  On  the  one  hand, 
imposing  costs  for  harboring  terrorism  may  induce 
the civilian population to stop or weaken support for 
terror organizations knowing the economic costs to be 
borne.  On  the  other,  however,  it  may  promote 
radicalization and mobilization for terrorist attacks as 
a result of worsening economic conditions. Evaluating 
the costs and benefits of policies along these lines is a 
very important issue that warrants further research. 
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